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Introduction
In a drab and c10udy spring morning of 1996 Baram fired his Kalashnikov at his
younger cousin Hilal. i Riddled with bullets Hilal fell to the ground and died
shortly after. The main reason for this tragic incident was a dispute over a piece
of un-irrigated land covered with oak trees (Querqus baloot), locally known as a
pare, which separated Baram and Hilal's house. As we shall see this incident was
only the last in a series of events which circumscribed and intertwined this land
dispute in a field of meaning which, in the final instance, made Baram kil Hilal.
Analyzing this incident this paper tries to uncover the structural aspects of death
enmity and the conceptions which underlie Kohistani notions of honour and
revenge. Moreover, the paper draws attention to the prevalenee of land disputes
and competing claims for ownership which account for the majority of enmities
and rivalries. The picture is not pretty, nor is it my intention to beautify it. Instead,
I want to move as close as possible to the series of events that led Baram, a proud,
passionate and, at times, belligerent Kohistani man in his mid-sixties to kilI his
cousin.2 The data for this paper draws on intermittent fieldwork in this and other
Kohistani vilages during 1997-98.
The setting
Indus Kohistan is located in the Pakistani Himalayan piedmont with mountains
raising to about 5,000 m above sea level (Figure 1). The area is reached by an
outlier of the monsoon and hot dry summers alternate with wet and cold winters.
The 1981 census estimates the population of Kohistan to be about 500,000, the
i All personal names and plaee names used in the paper are pseudonyms.
2 This mode of analysis gives a very dense text with a large east of eharaeters. I hope the
reader will bear with this shorteoming.
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majority of whom speak a dialeet known as Kohis'tyõ Shina. With the exception
of mineral ore and coniferous forests, the area has scant natural resources. There
is a large potential for hydropower development but few of the fast flowing rivers
have been harnessed for production of electricity. Long neglected, the area is
among the poorest in the NWFP and this has not changed much despite the fact
that the Karakoram Highway (KKH) was forced through the Indus gorge in 1978.
Completion of the KKH opened the region to external influences but inside the
valleys traditionallife has been slow to change. This, in particular, is the case for
the east bank of Indus where two major Kohistani watersheds - Palas and Jalkot
- remain inaccessible due to lack of roads. Visiting these valleys requires
extensive walking and in Jalkot the village Maji Ser (not shown on map) can only
be reached by a day's climb up a steep and exhausting footpath. Located at
approximately 2,000 meters above sea level vilagers are increasingly using Maji
Ser for year-round habitation. One-storey houses dot the mountain slopes and
perennial streams provide ample water for year-round habitation. The vilagers are
mountain farmers who combine pastoral animal husbandry with small-scale
agriculture spre ad out over a huge vertical gradient. The cyclical movements from
high er to lower elevations typical of Kohistani agro-pastoral adaption persists
(Barth 1956) but with reduced dependency on livestock, fewer families now
complete a full cycle. Despite heavy snowfall during winter some families do not
migrate to lower elevations near the Indus. Laeking a road, supplies are either
carried on the back or brought up on donkeys. Some families add to their meagre
income by working part-time as labourers in the larger cities during winter
months. Irrigated agriculture is based on monocropping of maize together with
some vegetables and potatoes. In recent years artificial fertilizers have been used
in smaller quantities but maize yields tend to be low. Maji Ser has a primary
school but as is common throughout Kohistan, the teaeher is absent and children
do not attend. Most adult men and women are iliterate but some have received
training in Arabie in madrassas and can read from the Quran.
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Preamble
Laeking the eyesores of road-side villages - brick-structures, pylons, trash - Maji
Ser looks like a tranquil mountain oasis. In real it y, the vilage is the site of a
number of longstanding disputes and vendettas witnessed, in part, by tall watch-
towers added to many houses. Due to the prevalenee of enmities many men never
step outside their house without being armed with rifles, automatic guns (machine)
and heavy leather bandoliers (gardani) lined with cartridges. For those involved
in death enmity (kané) being armed can no longer ensure a minimum of safety.
For protection they must keep themselves confined in their houses for months and
years on end. In rare cases, they are kept in confinement indefinitely.
Since the fateful day of kiling Hilal three years ago, Baram has been hiding from
Hilal's brother Khushal who seeks to revenge his brother's death. Confined in his
house Baram cannot move about much. Frequent visitors serve to break the feeling
of isolation but confinement is both mentally agonizing and physically straining.
With his two sons Baram spends a large part of the day praying, reading and
reciting from the Quran. He also plays affectionately with his granddaughters.
Some of Baram's opponents and il-wishers complain that he should neither pray
nor study the Quran because for a murderer there is no redemption. Undaunted,
Baram believes that his experience from long hunting trips and hours' waiting have
prepared him for the mental strain of being confined.
As is common among men his age Baram keeps his head shaved and his beard a
fists length. Seated in his shalwar kamiz and woollen-cap with tightly rolled up
brim, Baram is a friendly and caring host and it is easy to forget that he is also
a formidable foe. As one of Maji Ser's most experienced hunters Baram's agility
betrays his age. Baram has a well-earned reputation for being quarrelsome and has
over the years got himself entangled in a number of pro p ert y disputes, quarrels
and enmities. Kohistanis do not recognize formalleadership categories, but Baram
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is unquestionably a man of high stature and repute and a prominent member of
one of the larger patrilineages (za:t) in the vilage.3 However, the aggressive
defence of his interests has earned him many enemies and il-wishers. Since the
kiling of Hilal even Baram's elderly mother curses him and makes constant "il-
prey's" (shae) at his expense.
Situated in a steep hilside in the upper part of the vilage Baram's house is a
square one-storey building made from wood, stones and mud. Thick wooden doors
shut out the co Id as well as potential enemies. Inside the house there is a big chest
for storing dried maize, a few agricultural implements, some carpets, a blanket and
a few cooking utensils. On the wall a rifle, a Chinese made Kalashnikov and
bandoliers hang within easy reach. The brown mud-walls of the house are capped
by thick wooden beams blackened by years of smoke from the open fireplace.
Kohistani houses lack windows and the only light seeps in through the vent
separating the roof from the wall. During evening hours Baram and his sons gather
around the fireplace where resinous splinters of chir pine (Pinus roxburghi) are
burned to give light. Behind the wall separating the cooking quarters, women
speak in a hushed voice as they prepare food and sweet tea. Because the men in
the house are confined, the women are also responsible for collecting firewood and
tend the few animals.
Due to his enmity Baram has added a small watch-tower (gari) to his house. The
base of the watch-tower doubles as a latrine because he is prevented from leaving
the house. Peeping out from the watch-tower Baram can see the gre en valley
falling steeply down towards the main Jalkot watershed. Houses and bright yellow
3 Organized into named patrilineages of increasing scale (za:t~ tal~ dala~ quom), the
landowning Shins (ulsi'ya:) remain political patrons of non-Shin groups (be'za:t) who
perform various services against payment in cash and kind. The most important non-Shin
groups are the Akhars (blacksmiths ), Sarxhalis (load carriers), J ola (previously, weavers) and
the Gujars (herdsmen). The Doms (messengers, musicians) were expelled from Jalkot
decades ago when Maulvis branded their singing and daneing un-Islamic. In general, the
groups are strictly endogamous.
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maize-fields dot the hilside until the valley falls sharp ly and drops out of view.
Looking uphil he can see across the small gully separating his house and that
used by his enemy Khushal, as well as the evergreen coniferous forests beyond it.
At a distance lofty peaks and glaciers beacon, areas Baram knows intimately from
long hunting trips but now is prevented from visiting. On some roofs he can see
women bu sy sifting dried maize-corn, making it ready for miling. Further down
in the village the wooden mosque is barely visible, but there is no common call
for prayers (azan) and people offer their prayers in private. The soothing sound of
running water in streams and numerous water channels is only broken by
occasional barking of aggressive watch-dogs. Below his house Baram can see the
houses of his brothers and other neighbours. The terraced fields of other
neighbours are yellow from ripening maize but his own fields as well as those of
his brothers are laying idle.
The division of Mir Khan 's property
In order to understand the origin of the conflict between Baram and Hilal it is
necessary to retrace the history of the disputed pare, a piece of land that originally
belonged to Baram's father Mir Khan. Before his death Mir Khan initiated the
proeess of dividing the estate among his heirs. Mir Khan first set aside 1/8 of the
estate as the property of his wife and, according to tradition, kept 1/8 to himself.
The remaining part of the estate (approximately 3/4) was distributed and to
facilitate the division the six brothers where grouped into three, with one of the
three sisters in each group (Table 1, see also Figure 2). Using this principle fields,
oak forests and other landed property were divided into three and distributed
among the male heirs. After Mir Khan's death, the remaining 1/8 of his landed
property remained undivided. The land was un-irrigated and relatively steep, but
its location and many oak trees made this pare valuable.
6
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Table 1
Partible inheritance of Mir Khan's estate *
I Il II
Guldad Draz
Mosam Khan
WalIa
Baram J umal
"Sister A" "Sister B" "Sister e"
* Daughters/sisters inherit a half share as compared to men. They seldom claim
their share.
Two of the heirs - Baram and Guldad - at first laid c1aim to it. Prior to his death
Mir Khan had wanted to perform a pilgrimage to Mecca (ha)). Guldad insisted that
Mir Khan had asked him to perform a haj on his behalf. Baram, on the other hand,
c1aimed that Mir Khan had entrusted him with the execution of the inheritance and
appointed him as "trustee" (wakil). The trustee is responsible for distributing
charity food (kherat) to the poor after the death of the father. To finanee the costs
of the haj and charity food respectively, Baram and Guldad both claimed their
father's 1/8 of the estate. In order to solve this dispute they agreed to settle it in
a local court (Shariat) led by an Islamic scholar (Maulvi). Baram suggested selling
the land to the highest bidder and use the money to pay for the haj and
distributing charity food in honour of their father. The Maulvi reminded Baram
that the land could not be sold to outsiders as long any of the heirs were wiling
to buy it at a price suggested by two mediators. Since none of the brother's had
enough money to buy the pare, the Maulvi sugge sted that Baram and his five
brothers each pay Rs 2,000 as lease for their share of the land. This would
generate a total of Rs 12,000, which at that time was a normal expenditure for
performing a haj. With the help of their cousins the pare was divided among
Baram and his brothers, and the boundaries of each section were demarcated using
8
stones. Later, some of the heirs exchanged parts of the pare among themselves,4
thereby reducing the iiumber of owners from the original six, to the four (real)
brothers with the largest share belonging to Baram's brother Walia (Figure 2).
Despite having completed the division of the pare the brothers continued to
wrangle over their inheritance but none of them violated the agreement not to sell
their part of the pare to others.
Walia's sale of the pare
Baram's brother Waha is a follower of the Tablighi Jumaat ("community of
evangehsts"), a sect which has spread rapidly throughout Kohistan (cf. Keiser
1991).5 As a token of his Tablighi status Walia wears a black bandanna and of ten
carries a cotton shoulder bag for his religious books. Tablighis are held in high
esteem and expected to be virtuous Muslims. Considering the Tablighis emphasis
on personal virtues like sincerity and self-denial (Metcalf 1993: 600), Waha,
surprisingly, sold what he c1aimed was his share (1/6) of some fields jointly
inherited from his father and located near the river Indus. Without informing his
brothers Walia secretly sold his share to a vilager named Barkat for Rs 40,000.
The money was to be paid in instalments and Walia received Rs 2,000 as down
payment. By chanee Baram leamed about the deal and pressed Barkat to back off
from the sales agreement with Waha. Since Baram and Walia could not agree on
who owned the land sold to Barkat, Waha insisted that they try the case in a
Shariat. In a Shariat the claimant (in this case, Walia) bears the burden of
evidence and must produee two witnesses (unrelated to himself) in defence of his
4 In exchange for Jumal's part of the pare Draz gave him some agricultural fields. Later,
Walia and Draz agreed that in exchange for Draz's part of the pare, Walia would giv e him
some higher lying fields.
5 The Tablighi Jumaat is a proselytizing sect which is based on the teachings of Its founder,
Maullana Muhammad Zakariyya (1898-1982), which are disseminated as booklets and
pamphIets and by itinerant preachers (cf. Metcalf 1993).
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claim. The defendant (Baram), is only required to take an oath of ownership. The
Maulvi who was to lead the Shariat instructed Walia that he would have to
produee witnesses that he was a legitimate heir. If he could not produee any
witnesses the Maulvi advised him to have Baram swear that he was the sole owner
of the land and that it had never been owned by anyone else (In other words, put
Baram in position where he would have to commit perjury). Unable to produee
any witnesses in defence of his claim, Walia followed the Maulvi's advice and
aske d Baram swear that he owned the land. Without batting an eye Baram swore
under oath (lit. "on the Quran") that this piece of land only belonged to him.
Asked where he got it from, Baram replied that it had descended from the sky and
landed there for him only! On the basis of Baram's unlikely testimony, he was
awarded ownership of the land. The ruling also invalidated Barkats purehase of
the land from Walia.
Having lost all options for keeping the land, Barkat approached Walia and
demanded his money back. To complicate the matter, Walia had meanwhile
purchased a piece of land from another vilager for Rs 100,000. About half of it
Walia paid in cash by selling his livestock. The rest was to be paid in yearly
instalments. Walia's plan was to use the money from Barkat to finanee these
instalments. With this deal nullified, Walia came under pressure. He suddenly
owed two men a large sum of money and was desperate to find a way to pay his
debts. In spite of the brothers' agreement not to sell any part of the pare to
outsiders, Walia offered his part to his cousin HI1al. W ithout involving or
conferring with his elder brother, he agreed to buy the pare for Rs 36,000, to be
paid in cash and kind.
The killing of Hilal
When Khushallearnt that Hilal had purchased the pare he immediately sensed that
10
Baram might oppose it. Khushal also resented that in Baram's absenee one of his
sons had not been taken into confidenee and asked for help to demarcate the
boundaries of the pare. This was also important to Khushal because his fields were
adjacent to Walia's pare and they had previously disagreed over the boundary
separating them. When Baram returned to Maji Ser a fortnight later he quickly
learned about Walia's sale of the pare. Determined to have the deal cancelled,
Baram tried to convince Hilal to revoke the purehase. By now the dispute had
become a hot topic and vilagers anxiously watched how tensions grew between
them. Neither Baram nor Hilal show ed any inclination to compromise, fearing that
they would lose their prestige (haya bojon, lit. "honour goes") and be shamed
(sharam i:n, lit. "shame comes") in the eyes of the community.
They fateful day of the kiling - a wet and chily spring morning near the first
planting of maize - Hilal was alone in his court yard carrying an axe which he
used to prune fruit trees. During morning hours Baram arrived, carring his gun
over the shoulder. As is customary, Baram was offered a place to sit and a cup of
sweet tea and was joined by Hilal's father Sojat. After spending some time
discussing other matters Baram suddenly raised the issue of the disputed pare and
pleaded with Hilal and his father to cancel their purehase. They would not listen
and instead suggested that Baram and Walia sort out their differences in Shariat.
Baram again requested them not meddle in the case which had already caused so
much problems and planted the seed of enmity between the brothers.
Strong-minded, Hilal was unwiling to listen to Baram's plea and plainly refused
to cancel the deaL. Both men had now become agitated and although Sojat tried
to calm them down, Hilal yelled at Baram:6 "Y ou have gotten on our nerves
having disputes all over. You do not want to let us have it (the pare). Now I want
to see how you do it and I am going to cut shrubs from the pare right now". "By
God, I wil kil you in case you move ahead and cut the shrubs", Baram retorted.
6 All quotes are from taped interviews with Baram and Khushal.
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Sojat tried to restrain Hilal but he was unstoppable and came after Baram with an
axe:
Rilal followed me holding an axe in his hand. The words came out of my mouth,
"Man, do not come out here. I wil not allow you to cut the trees". Re responded
that he would not give it up for me. I swore to kill him if he came near me. Re
stopped, but then walked ahead. I swore again to kill him if he stepped ahead. I
spoke three divorces to stop him. But he did come. I pushe d a bullet into the gun
and pointed it at him. Re stopped. ... Re came for the third time and I moved the
gun ahead. Re raised his axe moving it back above the head. On it a dark night
appeared to me and I lost my mind. Suddenly I noticed that the man lay on the
ground and that is alL. The story happened this way.
Shortly after, Baram ran towards his house and bolted the door. When Khushal
heard the rifle shots he quickly left his work nearby and ran towards his house.
As he arrived on the scene he found Hilal lying on the ground. He was stil
breathing but bleeding profusely. Khushal ordered family members to move him
to a bed indoors. They recited the Muslim dec1aration of faith (Kalima) and
shortly after Hilal expired. The news of Hilal's murder spre ad quickly and soon
relatives and neighbours gathered around the dead body. Hilal's father Sojat was
extremely grieved. He put the head of his dead son in his lap and cried openly. He
murmured that his son died as a martyr (shaeed). To validate this c1aim Sojat told
onlookers that he had glanced the sun through the cloudy sky. Sojat advised
Khushal in front of all the villagers that it would be up to Hilal's sons when they
grew up whether they would take revenge (bada!) or forgive Baram.7 On the
request of Sojat only Hilal's waistcoat was taken off because as a martyr, taking
off his c10thes would reduce his merit (martaba). After being draped in a white
coffin c10th Hilal was buried the same day in a small graveyard on the top of the
hils near his house. Hilal was by many considered a martyr and scores of people,
7 By this he also eliminated the possibility of any compromise.
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including Baram's wife and daughters came to mourn the dead. Khushal arranged
for some relatives to serve charity food, and two goats were slaughtered and
prep are d for the vilagers who came to offer their condolences. Khushal also
invited Baram's brothers who, somewhat hesitant, joined the congregation of
mourners.
Later the same day Walia persuaded Khushal to walk down to the police station
(near Komila) and start a criminal investigation by launching a "First Inquiry
Report" (FIR). 8 As material evidence of the crime Khushal handed over Hilal's
blood-stained waistcoat to the police. Khushal had to bribe the policemen to have
them register a case against Baram, and later, to make them walk back to Maji Ser
with him to arrest Baram. By that time they arrived, Baram had escaped to a place
near the Indus and neither he nor his sons were around. People disliked that
Khushal had brought policemen to the vilage and nobody was wiling to be
recorded as witnesses. The policemen harassed the vilagers and, especially,
threatened to take one of Baram's brothers down to the police station for
questioning. In the end Khushal had to intervene and together with one of Hilal's
sons were recorded as witnesses. With their "investigations" completed, the
policemen left Maji Ser the next morning.
Back in Komila the policemen lost interest in the case and was not heard from
again. Not so in Maji Ser were people unanimously condemned Baram for kiling
Hilal, judging it utterly devoid of justification. Baram's brothers dec1ared that they
did not support Baram and would remain impartial, especially sine e the killed
person was their cousin too.9 Baram's two step-brothers also decided to stay
8 FIR's are frequently launched in cases of homicide and revenge kilings but the motive is
not to leave the matter with the police, but prevent the kil er from escaping to the lowland.
In practise men are able to escape arrest through the payment of min or bribes.
9 Brothers and first cousins are often perceived as equals, exemplified by the fact that the
term for brother (za:) is often used interchangeably for cousins too.
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impartial. In addition to being Khushal's brothers in-law (Figure 2), they had
exchanged their shares of the disputed pare at the time of Hilal's murder. This
gave them added reason to proclaim not being party to the enmity. Baram's two
sons sided with their father and joined him in his house confinement (ban bile).
As they would be legitimate targets for revenge kilings (haq), they were left with
little choice. In local terms, Khushal and Baram had gone from being "formal
opponents" (pecha, pL. pechai) to become "owners of death enmity" (kané
kawanu).
Abduction and compensation
Why did Baram get so passionate about a piece of land sold by his brother to a
paternal cousin (pice phe) - a cousin he otherwise was not only on friendly terms
with but who on many occasions supported Baram against critics and opponents?
And why did he not attack his younger brother Walia, who violated an explicit
agreement among the heirs not sell the pare to outsiders? To uncover possible
motives behind it we have to move back in time. Some years prior to the dispute
over the pare Sojat (Baram's uncle) had severely scolded and beat the wife of his
nephew Draz (Figure 2). To make matters worse Draz's infant son had been hurt
in the brawl. Knowing that Draz would be furious, the other women of the
household begged his wife to keep quiet about the incident. Stubbornly, Draz's
wife told her husband the news when he arrived late at night. When Draz learned
about it he got furious and proc1aimed that: "Y ou all stay witness that his (Sojats J
daughter is my wife from now on (awa:s thaus, lit. 'wife-to-be')".
When Sojat was informed about Draz's disgraceful claim to his daughter, he
announced that he would never ever marry his daughter to him. Trying to mediate
in the confliet, Baram urged Sojat to compromise and guaranteed that proper
compensation would be paid for the girL. Angered, Sojat insisted that he would
14
never marry her to a group of infidels like Baram and his brothers. More people
now got involved in the confliet, urging Sojat to marry his daughter to Draz, but
Sojat again declined. Watching the girl's every step, Draz was later able to abduct
her when she came to collect water from the spring near her house. He dragged
and pulled her into a nearby house where - with the help of two of his brothers
- he spent the night with her in great secrecy. For a while very few knew about
their disappearance but as news oftheir whereabouts spread, Sojat became greatly
shocked. A makeshift jirga consisting of all the vilagers belonging to his
patrilineage descended upon Sojats house and pleaded with him to forgive Draz.
Sojat was severely disturbed and dishonoured but forgave Draz on the condition
that a girl was given to his son Hilal as compensation (sora) for his abducted
daugther. Shortly after Draz came out of hi ding and went to Sojats house and
asked his forgiveness by offering an ox and a goat for slaughter at his door-step
(dar tho:n).io To help Draz, his brother Mosam Khan promised one of his
daughters to Hilal (Figure 2). (Before Hilal could be formally married to the girl
and consummate the marriage, he was kiled by Baram.)
This settlement prec1uded hostilities among the parties but hidden grievances and
mutual distrust was bound to linger on. According to public opinion Hilal's
purehase of the pare was more deeply motivated as a slight against Baram and his
brothers, and especially of Draz who abducted his sister. The sale of this piece of
land violated a vow taken under oath among Baram and his brothers not to sell it
to non-heirs. By buying the pare from Walia, Hilal was taking a covert revenge
for the abduction of his sister. As can b seen from details in the inheritance
proeess (above), the pare sold by Walia to Hilal had initially been inherited by
Draz. While this is only one of many possible interpretations or "readings" of
Hilal's purehase of the pare there is no doubt that Baram - like the rest of the
vilage - was aware of the possible insult to their honour. This could exp1ain
lO Taking animals for slaughtering at the offended party's doorstep is not regarded as a form
of compensation (uzar) but is done to show sincerity.
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Baram's increasing frustration as well as Hilal's stubborn unwilingness to cancel
the deal. To both parties the pare was no longer "only" a piece of land, it had
become a metaphor for the perceived insult to their honour. There was also a
material cause for Baram's frustration as he had been quarrelling with WalIa over
the boundaries separating their part of the pare. Moreover, the pare also included
some cedar trees (Cedrus deodara) owned jointly by all the brothers. Selling a part
of the pare would upstage the right to cut trees for building purposes. Another
factor could have weighed heavily on Baram, namely that all his agricultural fields
were restricted or "c1osed" (shar) for cultivation and they were lying idle.The
restriction on cultivation had not been enforced by Khushal - although this was
fully legitimate - but by Hakia, Baram's neighbour and opponent. 11 For this reason
the pare, which according to local definition was not a field, was an important
piece of land and useful for grazing of animals.
Hakia, Baram and the bando
All of Baram's fields are restricted from cultivation. The restriction of cultivation
precedes the dispute with Khushal and is linked to Baram's long-standing dispute
with his neighbour Hakia over an oak forest (bando, pl. band). More than fifty
years ago this oak forest was owned by a man from Palas, 12 but held in lease
(gahana) by a man from Maji Ser. Baram's father was able to sub-lease the forest
by paying money to the owner in Palas as well as the local lessee. At that time
Hakia's father suddenly claimed that the owner from Palas had offered him the
ii When enmities get serious the warring parties go into (semi-)confinement. The next step
is for one of the parties to announce a ban on cultivation of fields. The opponent
reciprocates by announcing a similiar ban. If necessary, they will enforce the ban by
shooting at bullocks brought to the field for ploughing. In rare cases, parties abstain from
announcing a ban on cultivation. Baram and Khushal's enmity is such an aberrant case.
12 During the finalland-distribution (wesh) in Palas about a century ago, some groups were
awarded private oak forests in the Jalkot watershed.
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same oak forest and that he had bought it. To settle the issue Baram's father
(seconded by his brothers) requested a Shariat over the forest to settle the issue
but Hakia's father refused. This began a series of quarrels over the oak forest and
Baram and Hakia inherited this dispute from their fathers. To end the problem
once and for all, Baram travelled to Palas and bought the oak forest from the
grandsons of the now deceased owner. Six men from Palas acted as witnesses of
the deal, but Hakia would not accept it. Baram later offered Hakia to settle the
issue in a Shariat but Hakia again refused.
Oak forests are valuable for a number of reasons. Oak leaves (buthu) are used as
animal fodder and grass provide winter browse for goats. Oak forests (which ten d
to lie at lower elevations) can therefore be leased against payment (qalang). In a
pinch, oak trees can be cut for sale as firewood in the market towns along the
KKH or used to fill own firewood needs. According to Keima, Hakia secretly cut
oak trees from the forest for sale as firewood. This became even more profitable
with the extension of a jeepable road into the lower part of the Jalkot watershed.
The dispute slowly soured their relationship until Hakia restricted Baram and his
brother Guldad's (who owned a share in the oak forest) fields from cultivation. In
return, Baram restricted Hakia's land too. Shortly after, Mosam Khan's (Baram's
brother) maize fields were mysteriously destroyed. Suspecting the involvement of
Hakia's cousin Maroof, Mosam Khan with the help of Baram's sons ruined
Maroots maize crop. The parties now began to exchange sporadie gunfire and in
one of these exchanges Hakia wounded Baram and his eldest son. Shortly after
Mosam Khan and Walia ambushed Hakia and wounded him in the thigh. The
wound was later successfully treated by a local doctor or "healer" (hakim ) but the
ambush made Halda restrict Mosam Khan and Walia's fields from cultivation.
Baram's two stepbrothers declIned to get involved citing unresolved differences
over their inheritance. Because Baram is confined in his house Hakia has managed
to lease out some of his own fields and oak forests, even though land under
restriction is not permitted to be leased to others. Moreover, the owner is
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prevented from using bullocks to plough the fields but allowed to let women
cultivate it using a hoe. Due to the low yields people rare ly think it is worth the
effort to cultivate land in this manner. Restrieting all an opponents fields from
cultivation is now commonplace. In earlier times restrieting cultivation was lImited
to the disputed land itself. If somebody was able to cultivate such land the other
party could forcefully take the yield.
Baram's confinement prevents him from ex erting pressure on Hakia and at the
same time he suffers from having all his land restricted from cultivation. It is no
surprise, therefore, that Baram finds:
the matter of restrieting land (shar) highly inappropriate. If someone kil1s a man,
one man is kil1ed in revenge. Similarly if a man goes chor ( "thief of honour", i.e.,
party to ilicIt sexual relationship) with a woman, just one man is considered chor.
But by restrieting land, the subsistence (rozi) of women, men as wel1 as children,
are restricted inc1uding that of the livestock. It is absolutely awful. ... Restrieting
land is quite contrary to (our) traditions and the religion.
Despite the suffering and agony the ban on cultivation inflicts, only recently was
amediator able to broker a fort y days' cease-fire (madan) between Hakia and
Baram and his brothers. Baram and Hakia agreed to settle their differences in a
Shariat but ownership of the disputed oak-forest was stil "in a fix" (kun di ha:ni)
because Hakia c1aimed that the original owner from Palas only owned some - not
all - of the forest. To complicate the matter Hakia's cousin (Maroof) intervened
and c1aimed that he too was a legitimate heir to part of the oak forest through a
share inherited from his grandmother.13 With the exception of the latest cease-fire
Hakia, Mosam Khan and Walia have been in a state of semi-confinement, closely
watching each other movements. This, effectively, precluded new attempts at
13 Linguistically the term for "enmity" (pechtob) and being opponents (pecha, pl. pechai) is
etymologically related to the term for cousin (pice phe). This reflects the fact that cousins
often become enemies.
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mediation and with Baram confined in his house Hakia has not been in a hurry to
settle the matter.
Confinement and mediation
Khushal's main strategy has been to keep Baram in confinement but in 1997 he
agreed to a two-months' cease-fire (madan). Since then, Khushal rejected Baram's
pleas for a temporary ceasefire as well as a more permanent settlement. Khushal's
justification for keeping Baram in confinement is that it allows Hilal's sons to
growold enough to decide whether to avenge their father. In respons e to Khushal's
denial of further ceasefires, Baram dec1ared that he would no longer be allowed
to utilize the pare. Khushal therefore put it in the custody (amanat) of a local
Maulvi but Baram's household repeatedly let their animals graze on it, much to
Khushal's resentment.
In 1998 pressure mounted on Khushal to agree to Baram's repeated request for a
temporary ceasefire. Initially Khushal angrily rejected it and insisted that the girl
originally promised to Hilal be engaged to him without further delay. Mosam
Khan, the girl's father, indignantly rejected it and would only engage her if
Khushal paid Rs 200,000 as brideprice. In Kohistan it is common - but no longer
always practised - that a widow is married to the deceased husband's brother or
immediate kino In this case Khushal is Hilal's only brother and therefore expected
to marry Hilal's widow. One reason why Khushal has not married her is that she
is the mother of seven children - all of them under aged. Marrying her would
strain Khushal's meagre resources and make him responsible for feeding the
children. According to public opinion, however, Khushal must first marr the
widow before c1aiming Hilal's fiancé as his wife. According to Islamic
jurisprudenee (din) there is no precedence for Khushal's c1aim to Hilal's fiancé.
Because the girl was only engaged and not married to Hilal, she can be exchanged
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to any marriage partner of her father's choice. Khushal sees this as irrelevant
arguing that by local tradition (qanun) the girl was promised to his brother as
compensation (sora, or uzar) for their abducted sister. Hilal's death does not
remove the claim to the girl and as Hilal's brother he is now entitled to take the
girl as his (second) wife.
Watching the conflct between Baram and Hilal with increasing displeasure, men
belonging to their patrilineage decided that it was time to intervene. Secretly
Baram had for a long time appealed to friends sympathetic to his plea to do their
best to break the deadlock. In the spring of 1998, a large jirga consisting oftwenty
men was finally assembled. In preparation for their mission jirga members took
an oath that they would treat all parties equally and not hide anything from each
other. They also made an "il-prey" of Gods destruction for anyone who violated
their agreement. They first asked Khushal's permission to consult all parties to the
conflict (Table 2). They also warned Khushal of the seriousness of the matter. The
enmity was getting out of hand and the patrilineage was becoming the laughing
stocle of the community. Their very survival in Maji Ser was at stake. Jirga
members threw four hats at Khushal's feet, a traditional way to enforce a request.
Hesitantly, Khushal agreed to let the jirga meet the parties but refused their
request to be given a "plain free hand" (thape khosh) to settle the matter. The jirga
members then dispersed and after spending a day and a night consulting with the
contestants, returned and assembled on the roof of Khushal's house. Two jirga
members kept insisting that Khushal had given them a "free hand" to find a
solution. In the end Khushal got angry and "swore that (he) was not wiling to
give them a free hand equivalent to a single hair" . Khushal urged them to
remember how the enmity had starte d and that the previous jirga had secured
Mosam Khan's daughter as compensation for his abducted sister. In addition,
Khushal wanted the jirga to sette the issue of the disputed pare. "Take care of
these two things", Khushal admonished, "and I wil agree to a ceasefire for as long
as you want". Promising to address these grievances the jirga members asked for
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a three-days cease-fire to find a solution to Baram's enmity with Hakia (more
specifically, with ending the restriction on cultivation) something Khushal angrily
refused. After more wrangling, Khushal reluctantly agreed to a one-day's ceasefire
so that the jirga could try to broker a temporary ceasefire with all the parties
involved. The jirga members went from house to house to make everybody agree.
Baram was more than wiling, saying that even if they decided to throw him in
front of Khushal with a dagger he would not object to it. The other parties all at
first dec1ined to give the jirga a free hand but later agreed to abide by the jirga's
decision. Baram's only allies, Mosam Khan and Walia, were also unwiling to give
the jirga a free hand but under pressure, agreed to abide by whatever the jirga
decided.
Table 2
Baram's opponents and allies
Party to the conflict Source of conflict Type of enmity
pare opponents (pechai)
Opponents Khushal
homicide death enmity (kané)
oak forest dispute (bilos)
Hakia
ambush opponents (pechai)
Maroof oak forest dispute (bilos)
Jumal/Draz inheritance dispute (bilos)
Alles Mosam Khan compensation * dispute (bilos)
WalIa debt ** dispute (bilos)
* Claims monetary compensation for giving girl in marriage
** Demands payment for sale of pare
Relieved that they had been able to make all parties cooperate the jirga members
were now left with the difficult decision of how they should rule. As this was the
season for sowing maize, time was short and they could not afford to delay their
decision. They decided to make the verdict short, decisive and unequivocal:
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· Khushal keeps the disputed pare and gets Mosam Khan's daughter. In addition,
Baram wil pay him Rs 200,000 as compensation - relaxable to Rs 100,000 at
Khushal's discretion - for kiling Hilal. As additional compensation, Baram and
his brothers wil choose one of their daughters to be engaged to Hilal's eldest
son.
· Hakia and Baram will divide the disputed oak forest between themselves. Hakia
gives one third to his cousin Maroof, or failing this, Baram and Hakia wil pay
Maroof the equivalent value in cash. Furthermore, Hakia must bring a bullock
and a goat to Baram's door-step asking his forgiveness. In return, Baram wil
con sider the scores of wounding on each side as even (Baram 2, against Hakia
1 ).
The verdict acknowledges the loss suffered by Khushal and awards him proper
compensation. This would put an end to his enmity with Baram and finish Baram's
three years in confinement. It would also end Baram and Hakia's restriction of
cultivation and share the oak forest between them. However, the verdict ties the
compensation for abduction together with the kiling of Hilal and releases Baram
from his confinement through the payment of a substantial amount of money.
Khushal got all he could hope for - and more - but accepting "blood-money" was
unacceptable and dishonourable. The jirga pleaded with Khushal again and again
to accept it, but he did not yield and inch and would not give up the right of
revenge and release Baram from his confinement. He saw the verdict as further
injustice against himself and the killing of his brother. Feeling that he was being
treated unfairly and made a scapegoat, Khushal lashed out against the jirga
members, requesting them to disperse: "Y ou twenty men stand up here having no
ability of getting just one girl, or taking any thing belonging to me. Then why
have you assembled here?", Khushal scolded them.
With Khushal's refusal to accept their verdict the settlement dea1 fell apart. A last
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minute effort by the jirga to salvage the deal proved fruitless as all parties reverted
to their initial positions and statements. Mosam Khan would no longer give his
daughter to Khushal without monetary compensation; Hakia would not split the
forest with Baram and Baram even threatened Khushal that from now on, all his
fields would be restricted from cultivation (but not those of I-Iial). At this point
the jirga was defeated and declared that there would neither be any further
attempts at mediation, nor would they in the future take any interest in the well-
being of the parties. Jirga members had only scorn for Khushal who was severely
criticized for having changed his mind about giving them a "free hand" to settle
the matter and accused of conspiring with Hakia to keep Baram confined
indefinitely.
Baram's confinement
Unlike Khushal, Baram has repeatedly signalled his wilingness to abide by any
decision reached by mediators. He has also offered to leave Maji Ser and settle in
the neighbouring Palas valley and give up the disputed pare. Baram's wilingness
to compromise, his explicit expression of guilt and the fact that he has not (yet)
restricted Khushal's land from cultivation, has redeemed him in the eyes of the
community. His honourable behaviour and self-confinement has slowly moved
public opinion in his favour. Baram is well versed in matters of local tradition and
has travelled far beyond Kohistan. In addition to his native Shina dialeet, he is
fluent in Urdu. Baram has also taken pains to educate his two sons who have
studied in a religious madrassa in the Punjabi hil-town Murree. Baram's youngest
son has during the past two years spent long periods fighting with the Taleban in
Afghanistan. Recently, Baram arranged for him to be married through an exchange
marriage (badali). Even in confinement, Baram is able to take care of the
household's interests. Baram has been forced to sell most of his livestock but has
purchased agriculturalland worth Rs 65,000 across the gully from his house. This
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has been possible by sending his sons to Qipat, the largest and most distant of the
mountain pastures in the Jalkot watershed. Some years back mineral ore, especially
green tourmaline (pe'rodot), was discovered in Qipat and has since been intensely
mined by teams of young men from villages in the Jalkot watershed.14 Since
Khushal is the sole provider for his household he cannot afford to leave for Qipat.
This allows Baram's sons to sneak out from Maji Ser and spend the summer
mining gemstones. It is money made from mining which has saved the household
from sliding into poverty during confinement.
Khushallacks both allies as well as grown up sons. Ris elderly father Sojat died
one year after the kiling of Hilal, meaning that Khushal must fend for himself.
In sheer fighting power there is no doubt that Baram and his sons could easily
overtake and kil Khushal. By strictly adhering to the local code of honour Baram
keeps himself confined, rather than is confined by KhushaL. Despite being watched
night-and-day, Baram and his sons are occasionally able to sneak out from Maji
Ser. Baram never ventures far but his sons travel to Rawalpindi or other large
cities with a diaspora Kohistani population. There is no evidence that Khushal has
ever attempted to ambush them outside Maji Ser, nor conspired with others to kil
or injure them travelling back and forth to the vilage. Nonetheless, Baram and his
sons must increasingly watch out for Khushal and Hilal's teenage sons. During the
summer of 1998 Khushal's ten year old son picked up a gun and fired at Baram's
house, barely missing one of Baram's sons. Demonstrating how the ide a ofrevenge
is implanted in children Khushal's son lamented that: "They killed my beautiful
uncle". However, Baram's teenage grandson moves freely in the vilage and even
plays with Khushal's sons. In this sense, enmity is limited to the main protagonists
14
Most young men from Maji Ser on ly work as labourers, but a few have been able to
establish themselves as local middle-men. The gemstone business is most often handled
by more wealthy external contractors who are able to cover the initial costs of purehasing
Swedish made "Pionjär" rock drills as well as dynamite for blasting. Due to the difficulty
of reaching the steep min ing sites and inexperience with this kind of work there has been
many fatal accidents during past years.
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and children and women can move unrestricted.15
By carefully managing his options during confinement Baram has marginalized
Khushal both socially and economically. In order to keep a watchful eye on Baram
Khushal cannot leave the vilage for longer periods. To make ends meet he has
been forced to sell most of his livestock and laeking grown-up sons who could
look after fields and the women, he is unable to spend the summer mining
precious gemstones. The need to watch over Baram also makes it difficult for
Khushal to fulfil the labour requirements inherent to agro-pastoralism. Unable to
cultivate his fields located beyond Maji Ser, Khushal must buy wheat flour to
make ends meet. Laeking other sources of income he is struggling to feed his
family. If Baram makes good his threat of c10sing Khushal's fields for cultivation
he wil have no choice but to leave Maji Ser.
Epilogue
With the tussle with Hakia stil unsolved Baram's fields are lying idle. This wil
make it impossible for Baram to cultivate his fields for the fourth consecutive
year. A long as he is kept in confinement by Khushal there is littIe scope of
reaching a settlement with Hakia. Out if desperation Baram could now decide that
his attempt to appease Khushal has achieved nothing and that he must put him
under pressure. The first step would be to restrict Khushal's land from cultivation,
then let it be known that he will shoot bullocks brought to the fields for
ploughing. Baram has threatened to c10se Khushal's fields for cultivation but he
has not done so yet as a token of his guilt over kiling Hilal. Baram hopes that -
in the end - Khushal wil adopt a "brotherly attitude" and agree to a settlement.
15 Women who escort husbands or close kin involved in death enmity are not attacked. In
rare cases women are legitimate targets, such as if a woman escorts the enemy to help
ambush a man sitting in confinement.
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Baram accepts that Khushal has a right to kilI him, but cannot accept that
confinement is us ed to make him give up the pare. It can only be settled
peacefully in a Shariat. This difference is reflected in how Baram himself sees the
possibilities for a solution:
There are precedents in the native land for solutians. There have been (other)
rivalries around here. Even brothers have killed one another. Cousins have also
killed each other. In rare cases, they have avenged (murder) also but some ofthem
have compromised as wel1. People take diyat (religiously fixed monetary
compensation) too and there happens a saz qasas (mutually agreed monetary
compensation) too. ... Lest if he killed me, I would not be unhappy. Re has a right
over me. I would not be offended if he did not agree to a ceasefire. I would not be
offended for he is my brother and he has a right over me. I wil not be offended
because I owe him a right (to kill). As for the pare, ifhe acquires it by Gods code,
he could have it.16 Shariat is an internal matter between us brothers. Iadvise him
not to buy enmity by paying rupees. Also he is not obliged to forgive me because
his man died at my hand. The pare cannot be a leverage to settle a blood-shed. The
approach for settling an economic issue is different and for a bloodshed is different.
As Baram points out, monetary compensation sometimes happens in the case of
murder among c10se kino The enmity between Baram and Khushal is a threat to
the cohesion of the whole patrilineage that weakens them vis-à-vis other
patrilineages. As such, infighting is discouraged and also explains why, in this rare
case of homicide among cousins, the parties can be pressured to overcome their
differences and accept monetary compensation. Baram is quarrellsome and often
a nuisance but his fearlessness discourages incursions by other patrilineages. For
this reason all the members of Baram's patrilineage, inc1uding Khushal himself,
are apprehensive about what wil happen if Baram is kiled. This is also one
16 Losing in a Shariat is not dishonourable, but there are many examples that the losing side
later disputes the ruling as well as the qualification of the Maulvi in charge.
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reason why they assembled twenty men to mediate in the matter. Baram is
pessimistic about any settlement with Khushal but does not fear for his future. He
has outstanding credits for gemstones sold to a contractor middle-man (tekhedar),
but puts his trust in God, not in money: "It is God who gives living (rozi) and it
does not come from (having) livestock. God has not created any dearth of food for
us although it is now the fourth year since we have gone into confinement" .
Under great pressure, Khushal is getting marginalized both socially and
economically. He is considering leaving Maji Ser and resettIe in the lowland. In
retrospect, he resents filing the FIR and curses Walia for impelling him to
prosecute Baram. But as Khushal laconically remarks, "The weak person always
goes underneath of someone's lap in the beginning or at the end. I am a weak man
and he is a strong wrestler". Khushal is pessimistic about the possibility for a
peaceful solution and thinks that "not on ly until Hilal's sons get older but til the
'Day of Judgement wil there be any solution to this issue".
Baram's brother Walia who started the problem by selling the pare has moved with
his family to a town near Peshawar with a sizeable Kohistani community. He now
makes his living as a woodcutter. One way to put Walia's actions into perspective
is that with all his fields c10sed for cultivation (by Hakia), he saw no other option
but to 1eave Maji Ser and resette outside Kohistan. By moving, Walia has
extricated himself from the problems he inflicted on his elder brother. Walia has
received almost all of the payment for the pare but has offered to return the
money to Khushal and have a Shariat with Baram the coming spring (1999) to
settle ownership of the pare.
Hilal has been dead for three years but his death continues to haunt the vilagers
of Maji Ser. A year after Hilal's death one of Baram's nephews helped dig a grave
next to Hilal's in preparation for a funeral. During digging a small hole appeared
in the side wall of the grave. U sing a mirror to look through the hole he could see
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Hilal's body. The body was unchanged and had not decomposed. Muslims believe
that martyrs only sleep in their grave, and this observation confirm ed that Hilal
was a martyr. Some even claim to have seen a bright flame at Hilal's grave,
further evidence many believe, that he was a martyr. Others, including local
Maulvis, believe that such flames are made when Satan rubs his nails and fires
and sparks fly into the air. In any case, Satan wil be pleased with the havoc and
misery caused by Baram 's kiling of HilaL.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper has attempted to frame events which although they happened recently,
have already been retold, remembered and reinterpreted by actors seeking to
justify their actions and recollections of the same incidents. In order to tell this
complex story the "narrative" has been used as a literary device (White 1990).
This narrativization of se enes and events comes c10se to what Ryle terms "thick
description" (1971: 482) and tries to convey not only "what happened" (causation,
temporality) and "why it happened" (interpretation, rendition) but also to describe
events as experienced by those "to whom it happened" (subjectivity). In my
opinion this first person subjectivity is important because Kohistanis are often
stereotyped as backward, sinister and cruel. They are neither of these things, even
though this is how they are portrayed by unsympathetic observers. Secondly, as
a piece of ethnography Baram's land dispute and subsequent kiling ofHilal allows
us to seek out the complexities and deeper motivations of organized vengeance,
a practise which is often stereotyped as "Kalashnikov Culture". As such, this story
confronts colonial ethnography's distortion of the hil peoples of South Asia
(Kennedy 1991) and tribes of the North-West Frontier (Lindholm 1980). An
example of this distortion is Lt.-Col Schomberg's (1935: 246) shallow rendition
of the "history" of Darel and Tangir, two Kohistani valleys north of Jalkot:
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the history of the two valleys has been but a dreary tale of murder and b100d-feuds.
So bad has it now becorne that there is no house without a vendetta, and life has
becorne intolerable. Even murder appears to have lost its charrn ; and the savages
are sated with b10od.
Kohistanis are neither gun-crazy madmen nor are they - as implied by Schomberg
- savages driven by a natural instinct to kil. Neither are they helpless victims of
a tradition that condemns them to take revenge as implied by "cultural idealIsm".
While interne eine feuds and vendettas are common, mediation and reconciliation,
through payment or exchange of young women for marriage, can bring enmities
to a peaceful conclusion. While it is unwise to generaIIze from this case only -
especially because homicide among cousins is rare - we can also see why enmities
drag on, despite attempts at mediation. In cases of death enmity the aggrieved
party can disregard jirga decisions, but only at gre at social costs and for fear of
being ostracized. Unlike Keiser's (1986) study from Dir Kohistan patrilineages
seek to limit the scale and severity of conflicts.
To an outsider it would appear that all lose out from getting entangled in death
enmity. The killing moves the enmity beyond the original source of conflict and
gets entangled in the larger issue of personal honour and right of revenge (haq).
Accepting monetary compensation reflects negatively upon the family's honour.
The problem of retaIIation can be summarized by the proverb "Damn if you do -
damn if you don 't" . If you renounce taking revenge your hónour suffers and your
status dec1ines. If you seek revenge, retalIation wil follow until the scores are
settled on each side. This underlines the seriousness of death enmity compared to
quarrels, tussles, and shoout-outs where no one is kiled.
There are several ways of explaining the prevalenee of death enmity in this
vilage, and more generally in Kohistan. A number of theories and factors have
been advanced to account for homicide and blood revenge (Table 3). While some,
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controversially, focus on genes and genetie factors others foreground social,
cultural or ecological aspects, or a combination of the three. In the remainder, I
wil discuss some of these factors with reference to this case materiaL.
Table 3
Factors attributed to aggression, homicide and
blood revenge
Explanatory factor Reference
Genetics Chagnon (1988)
Personality/ emotions RosaIdo (1980)
Iliteracy and ignoranee Içli (1994)
Poverty/adaptation Schneider (1971)
Land shortage Meggitt (1977)
Cultural ("idealism") Keiser (1991)
Ecology ("functionalism") Boehm (1984)
State-forrnation Blok (1975)
I agree with Blok (1975: 10) that "a long-term perspective has been systematically
neglected in socIal theory since Durkheim". The problem in Kohistan is the lack
of written history which makes this kind of historicizing very difficult (but see,
Zarin and Schmidt 1984). The valleys on the east bank of the Indus have been
shrouded in a mist of obscurity and until recently, no foreigners were able to
penetrate the area (Knudsen forthcoming). However, there is ample evidence that
death enmity is bound up with long historical trajectories. Oral sources from Palas
and Jalkot suggests that enmity previously involved larger kinship groups, even
valleys, against each other (Zarin and Schmidt 1984). As shown by the example
of Baram's property dispute there is a tendency for enmities to become privatized
and lImited to c10se kin belonging to the same mzras (i.e., descendants of the same
grandfather). Increasingly, close relatives, even brothers, now proc1aim that they
wil stay impartial and are able to do this without a loss to their honour.
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The implications of this case for the study of resource management strategies are
that they cannot be de-linked from their embeddedness in socIal and cultural
matrices. As such, idle fields can be read as markers in the cultured landscape -
they tell stories of enmity and opposition. Property relations in Kohistan are not
only social and economical, but burst into moral arenas and lon g historical
trajectories of enmity. Property disputes invokes competing and contested histories
of ownership which take on properties of "tournaments ofvalue" (Appadurai 1986:
21), that is, fields and oak forests become key "tokens of value" whose
importanee extend beyond their economic value as they get entangled with honour
and unwillingness to compromise. Fields become metonymic signifiers of central
cultural values and attention shifts from the fields themselves to the contest of
honour. The division into separate realms is reflected in the fact that revenge
kilings can only be mediated through the "law of the land" (qanun) in consensus
assemblies (jirga), while ownership of land must be decided on the basis of
Islamic jurisprudenee (din) in a local court (Shariat) led by a religious scholar
(Maulvi).
It is striking that death enmity tends to be a foot-hils, piedmont phenomenon. One
reason can be that such areas ten d to be economically marginaL. This has two
implications. Few income possibilities other than small-scale agriculture (hence the
importanee of land for survival) and low education leveIs. The importanee of
iliteracy is not its implied link to "ignorance" (Içli 1994), but that it makes people
distrust cadastral surveys and land titling and therefore cannot refer land-c1aims
or property disputes to state-institutions. Instead, ownership to land is inherently
contestable and becomes a question of historical legitimacy and brute force, but
also of elever manipulation of local notions of right and wrong, good and bad. It
would therefore be a mistake to analyze property relations from a de jure angle.
Instead, property relations are subject to contested histories of de facto ownership,
where "might" is more important than "right". The lack of cultivatable land and
resultant poverty mean that Kohistanis must defend their fields against incursions
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and keep constantly vigilant about protecting their landed property. Herzfeld is
right to point out that the "division of property among co-heirs ... is of ten marked
by tension, mutual distrusts, and occasional violence" (1980: 91). From this case
material we can see that people not only wrangle over their inheritance, but also
fields and forests purchased from others. One reason for this is that a significant
part of the oak forests in the lower Jalkot watershed were awarded to groups in
the neighbouring Palas valley during the last general land distribution (wesh).
Trying to take control of oak forests at one time leased or purchased from the
original owners in Palas vilagers ofMaji Ser get entangled in brawls, disputes and
enmities. This does not explain the genesis of blood revenge but can explain why
disputes over oak forests become a matter of survival and, literally, deadly serious.
Aspects of social organization, especially (male-) partible inheritance and a large
number of offspring (strengthened by the high frequency of taking asecond wife)
over time cause severe field fragmentation. Feuds and enmity are of ten associated
with pastoral adaptations. Schneider (1971: 9) speculates that transition to a
sedentary lifestyle and increased dependenee on agriculture increase the potential
for conflict. Evidence from Maji Ser lends support to this hypothesis and there is
a reduced dependency on livestock in favour of agriculture. This is probably one
reason why many men seek to buy additional land (and oak forest) to become
viable economic units and explains why scarce landed property is so valuable.
Another reason for the current shortage of arable land is that the practice of
breaking new fields, locally known as khils, has mostly vanished due to lack of
water.17 While shortage of land has frequently been used to explain tribal warfare
and feuding (Meggitt, 1977: 178: for an opposing view, cf. Silitoe 1978: 268), it
would be a mistake to treat this as a single explanatory factor for the prevalenee
17 Rather than lack of water itself, it might be related to a lack of water channels needed to
delIver water where needed. Extension of existing waterworks, which tend to be
technologically simple and spatially compact, has been hindered by interneeine rivalry (cf.
Allan 1991: 71).
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of death enmity in Kohistan. Indeed, many Kohistani vilages experience a
demographie decline with a net rate of emigration. The prevalenee of enmities -
sometimes in combination with poverty - is one reason why individuals,
households (such as Walia's) and, on occasion, whole lineages choose to resettle.
During the summer of 1998 all members of a minority lineage (approximately 25
households) left a vilage in the lower Palas valley after getting involved in death
enmity with the majority lineage. It would still be patently wrong to interpret this
as evidence of Boehm's (1984) functionalist argument that the ultimate purpose of
feuds is to control population growth in a situation of scarce resources.18 It could
be argued, contra Boehm, that enmity has become endemic and reached
dysfunctionallevels, hence, is socially anomic in Durkheim's sense.
Traditionally rural villages ten d to be thought of as a "moral community", a
Gemeinschaft where transactions are based on status and there is a pronounced
communality. With the prevalenee ofpatemal cousin marriages and local exchange
marriages in Maji Ser most vilagers are c10sely related. However, their prime
allegianee is with their immediate male kin (miras, i.e., descendants of the same
grandfather) and secondly, their own patrilineage, not with the community as such.
In Maji Ser the values of the community and the "law of the land" (qanun) to a
large degree legitimize frequent brawls, c1ashes, enmities and feuds. Therefore,
being involved in or party to enmities is not condemned - failing to conform to
local ethics and aesthetics of fighting is. Theories of self and emotion have been
advanced to account for the increasing resort to homicide and revenge kilings in
Dir Kohistan (Keiser 1986), but there is littIe evidence that vilagers of Maji Ser
are easily enraged or especially emotional. Being poor, however, make them
vulnerable and liable to attack even minor infractions on their landed property.
Similarly, being concemed about their honour even petty insults are harshly
reciprocated. Understood in more abstract terms as competition over "scaree
18 Cf. Shaw's distinetion between "ultimate" and "proximate" factors (1989).
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resources" both are zero-sum games where your loss is another's gain.
The continuation of revenge kilings in Kohistan may be related to the special type
of "state formation" (Bl ok 1975) inherited from British rule. Kohistan is formally
a "settled distriet" but remains politically peripheral to the state and its law-
enforcing ageneies. In practice, Kohistan belongs to the "tribal belt" extending
through the borderlands of the NWFP. Due in large part to the absenee of state
institutions a system of anarchic social organization has survived until today, and
can explain the preference for local conflict resolution. Even with the proliferation
of weapons among Kohistanis there is litte evidence that acephalous societies are
particularly vulnerable or conducive to blood feud and aggression (cf. Kressel
1996).
Enmities in Maji Ser, and possibly elsewhere in Kohistan too, are not arbitrary
series of violent acts but conducted according to a scheme or script defined by
local traditions and rules laid down or legitimized by the Quran (for example, the
right of revenge).19 What we see from this example is not blind violence but
carefully meted out offenee and retaliation. The respons e is meant to match the
offenee and there are few examples of cold-blooded murder or murder without
reason. Most often shooting is meant to wound or maim, not to kil a person. As
such, enmities are highly structured and ritualized events (Kressel 1996: 11) which
tend to follow a stylized pattern of:
(l) Provocation,
(2) Confrontation,
followed by either;
19 These "scripts" are not necessarily Kohistani inventions but adopted and later adapted
from the neighbouring Pashtuns (Barth, 1980 (1959); for a more recent account see, Grima
1993: 70ff.).
34
(3) Mediation
(4) Reconciliation,
or, failing this,
(5) Retaliation
(6) Escalation.
In the latter case (5 & 6), rather than swift and decisive retaliation people may
wait five, ten, and sometimes, twenty years before taking revenge and this does
not reflect negatively upon their honour. As long as they do not publiely retract
their right of revenge the family's honour does not suffer. By seeking refuge or
self-confinement (ban bile) enemies begin a painful war of attrition and a slow -
but inevitable - drift into poverty and misery?O With land restricted from
cultivation the family is forced to buy more of their subsistence food. This wil
over time erode savings and often livestock and/or land must be sold or simply
consumed. It can be speculated that newfound options for paid work as seasonal
labourers make it possible to prolong enmities, because a winter's savings can last
a family to the next season. Although the families' suffer, they can survive on such
income in lieu of any produee from their agricultural fields. The importanee of
finding ways to earn additional money is elearly shown by comparing the financial
status of Baram and Hilal. Baram's fields are closed for cultivation but by mining
gemstones he is better off than his opponent.
In this paper I have us ed the "narrative" as a literary device to scrutinize enmities
and blood revenge in Kohistan. If, finally, one looks at this narrative from a
20 Poor families are, in general, unable to stay confined for longer periods and forced to
resettle in one of the lowland Kohistani communities. Resettlement gives temporary relief
from hostilities but does not end them. Instead, surprise attacks, raids and ambushes of ten
follow. Maji Ser, at times, functions as a refuge for people who have escaped enmities
from other Kohistani valleys.
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literary angle it contains a storyline or "plot" ("The Kiling of Hilal"), a east of
main characters ("Baram and Khushal"), a scene or setting ("The Vilage", or,
"LittIe Community") but strangely missing is an "end" or "finale" that would bring
events to a conc1usion. The absenee of this narrative structural element reflects a
characteristic of blood feuds and vendettas - they do not end. Instead of ending,
disappearing or vanishing, histories of kiling and fighting remain inscribed in the
collective memory of the vilage and imprinted on the landscape as idle fields,
imposing watch-towers and scenes and sites of kiling.
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Summary
This paper reconstructs the events that unleashed death
enmity between two closely related men. Recounting this
complex story from the angle of the contestants challenges
simplistic cultural and material explanations of organized
vengeance. Frequent disputes over land e d property,
especially fields and forest, engender enmity and rivalry
but the intensity of these disputes cannot be understoood
without uncovering their link to Kohistani notions of
honour and revenge.
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